PDF Duns Scotus on Time and Existence: The Questions on Aristotles De interpretatione

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Learn More - opens in a new window or tab. Related sponsored items Feedback on our suggestions - Related sponsored items. The Gift of Gold. Gonzalez; Lulu Delacre. Another Reply to Question 11] [a. For a minor about contingency can be tak- en as true for the future, in connection with which it does not have to be [the case] that the major is true, since it is sufficient that it be true for a single time. But when the major is absolutely assertoric, then for whichever time the minor is true, the major is true for the same time because it is always true. For that reason, it is necessary that the extremes be united in the middle term for the same time, but not when the major is assertoric and as-of-now.

Works by Allan Bäck - PhilPapers

And there is no defect in the variety of supposita for which the middle term is taken in the major and minor premises. That is because pastness is extraneous to them and to other differentia of time insofar as they are per se supposita of a common term.

11. Jeremy Daggett - Scotus' Proof of the First Being

But in the other sense, viz. That is, in sense [ii] of n.

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The section headings and quotation marks in the critical edition are mistaken here. We have used an ellipsis here to keep our numbering in line with the edition. But the proposition from the contingent mode has another sense, viz. For all com- position can leave behind its mode of understanding concerning the extremes, although without any real restriction of the supposita. Assuming this, it can be granted that these senses are antecedents to a proposition about contingency, i. For although a term is distributed by a unique actuality for all per se supposita, yet it is not dis- tributed for all by a unique actuality insofar as they are per se supposita and inso- far as they are taken under an extraneous aspect.

Therefore if, in another sense—viz. But composition does not convey anything real concerning the extremes, as was said previously. In another sense, viz. Yet, with the proposition taken in that under- standing, the syllogism holds formally. But this is because dis- tribution is made for it insofar as it participates in the form of man and is taken under the aspect of white.

So it is in the case at hand. If the per se suppositum is the same as what is contingent, the distribution is made for it in a major premise about necessity insofar as it is a per se suppositum, and it is not taken as such in a minor premise about contingency, but under an extraneous aspect. Therefore, the opposite is true. Reply to the Question] [A.

First Opinion] [7] Reply: it is said that the first [argument] is absolutely false because of the arguments already presented and others as well. For no one is a man unless he is a man now; this is not applicable to Caesar. Or perhaps if he does not say this though it is true , it can be said that by the word he meant only what is signified by the expression, i.

Works by Allan Bäck

Or if by chance he meant [this] as regards the predication, viz. Thomas S. Maloney Leiden: Brill, , c. Now what removes the per se cause of any effect also removes the effect of that cause, because if Soc- rates is similar to Plato in whiteness, what removes the whiteness removes the similarity.

Second Opinion] [A. For this reason, if the thing that is signified vocally exists, I can truly attribute present being [esse de praesenti] to it; but if it does not exist, I could not truly attribute present being to it.

Simon of Faver- sham, Quaestiones antiquae super libros Post. But substantial change destroys the subject, and it does not hap- pen except by destruction of the subject. For this reason, in substantial change the subject ceases to be itself; if the opposite were assumed, it would not be cor- rupted, because if it does not cease to be itself, it does not cease to be. But it is not so as regards Caesar.

Duns Scotus

One change is substantial, which changes a thing in name and definition, and which is called generation or corruption. The other is accidental change, which does not change a thing in name or definition, but only in accidental dispositions, i. Actually, Boethius. On the part of the subject, however, it is not the case that something must be specified by it; therefore, it does not fall into identity with the subject.

First Opinion] [A. Exposition of the Opinion] [1] The argument of some is that the composition by which a thing verbal- ly signified is composed with a subject is measured by the present time because it is necessary for the extremes to be measured by the same measure by which the composition is measured.